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Introduction  
At the national level, decentralisation policies and redistributive land reforms (Deininger, 2003; 
UN-DESA, 2005; Cotula, 2004, 2009) are generally evoked as a crucial element in the way to the 
reduction of poverty. Decentralization policies are supposed to bring central governments closer to 
the people, to make them more reachable and accountable, to strengthen popular control over 
policy-makers and decision-making process; on the other hand, land reforms redistribute and secure 
land access providing poor with their own livelihood. At the same time, their actual effectiveness is 
still debated (Crook, 2003, Herring, 2003, Vedeld, 2003). The aim of this work is to address 
decentralisation and land reform for the case of Senegal. 
To asses these policies, I resort to a recent approach claiming the need for a more political analysis 
of poverty reduction. This approach moves from the limits of econometric and purely institutional 
studies, to provide a different assumption of poverty as power inequalities, lack of participation and 
rights and highlights the role of poor people and the relations among local actors in the actual 
implementation of poverty reduction interventions. The concept of political space used in this 
analysis provide a valuable analytical tool which allows to address these policies not only in their 
immediate institutional dimension but also by providing a closer insight of social and political 
dynamics that might hamper poor to emerge from their condition. Senegal was chosen because of 
its long-lasting commitment to both these policies. Short after its independence in 1960, an 
innovative land reform has been introduced, establishing democratic elected rural council titled to 
manage land (re)-allocation, abolishing the traditional rights and aimed to redistribute the land 
among rural peasants, in order to keep it productive. This reform takes hold with two successive 
decentralisation reforms in 1972 and in 1996. Moreover, rural society in Senegal is composed of 
powerful actors as rural and religious elites and their relations with poor people are crucial elements 
in the implementation of these policies. Senegal case study allows to assess these policies by taking 
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into account political and social dynamics involved in their implementation and it represents a 
notable example to understand the actual functioning of these politics in West-African context. 
 
Research question and research objectives  
The aim of this work is to assess to what extent national policies favoured or constrained the 
reduction of poverty. To what extent decentralisation policy and land reform have benefited poor 
and reduced poverty in Senegal? In this thesis, to answer this question, I use a political approach to 
investigate poverty reduction. In this framework, the reduction of poverty is not merely the 
reallocation of resources, but it is also the shifting of power relations within which poor people are 
embedded (Hickey and Braking, 2005: 851). Then, reducing poverty means strengthening social 
and political power of poor and popular agencies, their participation in the policy-making process 
concerning them (Friedman, 1995; Narayan, 2002; Sen, 1981, 1991; Webster and Engberg-
Pedersen 2002). I argue that such power shift can take place when a political space emerges, a space 
that can be controlled, contested, used by poor to pursue and defend their interest. Institutional 
channels that involve poor people in the decision-making process, political and social practices that 
foster participation and mobilise poor people are two crucial dimensions of the political space, 
analysed in this thesis.  
Land reforms and especially decentralisation policies are generally designed to increase political 
participation and government’s accountability, to alter the political landscape and the power 
relations it underpins. This study suggests that while the focus on institutions is welcome, the way 
in which key subaltern actors, as local politicians, elites operates within this space may compromise 
even the best designed policies. 
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Thus, a political assessment is crucial to shed light on the factors that influence national policies for 
poverty reduction, since it provides a more comprehensive understanding of political dynamics that 
promote or reduce the effectiveness of these interventions.  
 
Theoretical framework 
From numbers and institutions to agents and participation. 
The dominant approaches to poverty reduction are largely focused on institutions and policy design 
as central momentum of the fight against poverty. The authors find that a “pro-growth policy 
package”, (Lopez, 2004: 18) made of macroeconomics stability and trade openness, has a positive 
impact on poverty reduction (Dollar et al. 2002, 2016; Fosu, 2017); other scholars suggest that 
policies should boost to a pro-poor growth reducing income inequality (Ravillion, 2001; Ravallion 
and Chen, 2003), or remove the barriers “that prevent the poor from participating in markets” 
(Cooney and Willams Shanks, 2010: 29). 
These approaches bring two potential shortcomings. Empirically, these studies, especially 
econometric ones, make a widespread use of indicators (GDP, GDP per capita, income per capita 
etc.) based on data – national account – and dataset that are very likely to be inaccurate and 
misleading. (Blades, 1980; Devarajan, 2013; Jerven, 2013; Young, 2012). Thus, a “[GDP] increase 
of 3 percent might mean anything from no growth at all to an increase of 6 percent” (Blades, 1980: 
70) and designing policies might do little or nothing to counter poverty. 
A second limit comes from the ontological assumptions about poverty, which are largely ahistorical 
and decontextualized (Green, 2006; Green and Hulme, 2005). These studies mostly rely on 
economic and income-based measurement of poverty, where poverty is defined as the inability to 
attain a minimal standard of living (Lipton and Van der Gaag, 1993: 33; Malick, 1998: 11 – 12; 
Samuah and Wiafe, 2015: 11) and poor as those “unable to feed and clothe themselves properly” 
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(Dixon and Macarov, 1998: 1). Recent multidimensional indicators, such as the Human 
Development Index (HDI), include “gross national income per capita [that] reflects the ability to 
achieve a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2016: 3). Even the Multidimensional Poverty index that 
should capture nonincome dimension of poverty finally fall within this ontological assumption, 
since its six “living standard” indicators “are likely to be correlated with consumption or income” 
(Ravallion, 2010) In turn, poverty reduction is simply “the consequence of economic policies and 
the productive strategies of individuals and households, with poverty as a state into which people 
fall and from which they can be lifted if their incomes increase.” (Green and Hulme, 2005: 687).  
Lipton’s Urban bias theory (1977) and Bates’ studies (1981, 1983) on African agriculture started 
highlighting political and social struggles that underlie policy intervention. Especially, they point 
out how the state and the market exploit and extract resources from the rural classes in favours of 
cities and urban population, where political power is concentred. Lipton (1977: 328–40) argue that 
Poverty reduction policies should be oriented to invert this trend, facilitating land-to-the-tiller 
reforms, agrarian reforms and allocating more resources to the productive small farmers. Bates 
(2007; Bates and Block, 2013) argues that democratic institutions may stop this dynamic. In a 
democratic environment, rural dwellers represent a big part of popular vote and so of democratic 
power. Therefore, politicians and elites have an incentive to design policies closer to farmers and 
poor’s interests (Bates, 2007; Bates and Block, 2013).  
On a similar vein, Mosley (2012) and Khoo (2012) have underlined the role of elite’s commitment 
in poverty eradication. Mosley argued that political elites pursuing pro-poor policies open to a 
virtuous cycle that enhances both governmental stability and poor’s life conditions.  Khoo stressed 
that state and elites’ ideological commitment to anti-poverty goals were essential to define the 
“policy configuration” that sustained economic growth, development and poverty decline in 
Malaysia.  
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This research enlightens the political interaction among different powerful groups and poverty. 
Their recommendations for reforms are nevertheless institutional “in the sense that they address 
themselves to an altering of the policy-induced incentive structures and institutional framework” 
(Martinussen, 1997: 138). These approaches have some limitations. For example, because of the 
power that lies behind ‘the land’ in rural areas, land-to-the-tiller reforms or others pro-poor reforms 
might have to face the resistance of local elites and landlords. Thus, shaping these reforms becomes 
more the result of political struggles than an institutional outcome, where the participation of 
mobilised peasants’ movements is a critical element (Herring, 2003; Veltmeyer, 1997). Moreover, 
as argued by Teichman (2012), by presenting institutions as “autonomous forces producing path-
dependent sequences that shape action and therefore outcome” (Teichman, 2012: 4), scholars 
overlook that these same institutions are manipulated and distorted by powerful social forces for 
their own interest, with sensitive implications for the distributive outcome. In this context, poverty 
is rather the consequence of power inequalities, poor people are active agents, (Hickey, 2005; 
Teichman, 2012; Webster and Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2002) and the politics of poverty reduction 
should aim at shifting power relations in which poor people are embedded (Hickey, 2005: 851). 
Consequently, more ‘politics’ is still needed. More ‘politics to deeply understand the political 
dynamics of poverty reduction and especially the role played by subaltern actors and the way in 
which they may promote or constraint a shift in power relations in favour of the poor. this approach 
is also a reflection of changes in the interpretation of participation within development and politics 
of poverty reduction. Participation is increasingly associated and linked to citizenship, democratic 
governance and decentralisation (for an overview see Hickey and Mohan, 2013: 3 – 24; Laderchi, 
2001). Broadly, the concept of participation has been closely related to a simple mechanism of 
consultation, in which people are more or less simple ‘choosers’, in the sense that their only power 
was to accept or refuse predetermined governments programmes, defined in partnership with 
international development institutions. Concurrently, the concept of citizenship has been the 
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expression of a liberal and individualist tradition in which people, as users of a service, are provided 
with an equal set of rights and responsibilities bestowed by the state (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000: 
53 - 56, Gaventa, 2004).  Even when a strong participatory rhetoric was employed, as in the case of 
World Bank’s Social Investments Founds (SIFs) or the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs), 
they reported the same barriers to participation and lack of access to interested communities (Brock 
et al., 2001: 15).  
The recent frame (Cornwall, 2002; Coelho et al., 2002; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; McGee et al., 
2003) stresses instead an inclusive dimension of both participation and citizenship, where people, as 
citizens, are entitled to the right to get involved, to act (Lister, 1998: 228). This link among 
participation, citizenship and the political arena represent a critical point in this understanding of 
poor people: no longer as users or choosers of interventions and projects made by others, but as 
active “makers and shapers” (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). Scholars showed that when claims are 
(re)framed in terms of citizenship – thus, as a right – this shift has proven to be crucial in claiming 
economic, social and political changes (Grugel and Piper, 2009: 89; Grugel and Nem Singh, 2015: 
354; Grugel, 2003) 
Participation, power and political space 
As argued by Grugel et al. (2017: 10, 189), the politics of the marginals involves a process of 
(re)claiming power since most of the inequalities in the contemporary world are rooted in power 
relations. Current approaches are paying closer attention to the power and political relations that fill 
participatory spaces for development, introducing the concepts of “political space” or “policy 
spaces” (Brock et al., 2001, Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Cornwall and Coelho, 
2006; Gaventa and Barret, 2012; McGee, 2004; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). With these concepts, 
these authors refer to the spaces where poor people, or actors on their behalf, can exercise a 
participatory political agency. In defining these spaces, these scholars move away from the main 
criticism in the participation approaches to poverty reduction and development, which is the 
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tendency to treat the sites where participation take place as self-evident and unproblematic 
categories (Brock et al., 2001; Cornwall, 2002; Hickey and Mohan, 2004).  
These studies are largely informed by French post-war social theories, especially the work of 
Foucault (1975, 1978, 1982) and Lefebvre (1974) on power and space and how political and social 
relations are produced and reproduced in the space. For Foucault, power is not simply a “group of 
institutions and mechanisms”, instead it is rooted in all social relations, it is “the process which, 
through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them” 
(Foucault, 1978: 92). In his work The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre claims: “(Social) space 
is a (social) product […], a means of domination and power. […] Space contains social relations, 
[…] [it] is not a collection of things, a sum of fact, a filled void (Lefebvre, 1974: 35 – 36; my 
transl.)”. The creation of new participatory institutions is not immune to power, political and social 
relations existing in a society. This is not intended to deny the importance of such institutions but 
rather requires taking into account the presence of such relations in the analysis of these same 
institutions (Foucault, 1982: 790). These power relations define the boundaries of this space setting 
that can join them, what is possible to do with and within them (Gaventa, 2006: 26).  
Democratisation processes and decentralisation reforms are key political processes that may shape 
the political space. Studies have shown that democratic regimes are better than nondemocratic 
regimes in improving the welfare of the poor (Moon and Dixon, 1985; Przeworski et al. 2000). 
Furthermore, contrary to a conventional wisdom (Barro, 1996: 204; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 
2005: 79; Lipset, 1963: 31), recent research shows that poor people are as willing as any other 
citizen to participate to democratic activity and equally imbued with democratic values (Krishna, 
2008a, 2008b; Krishna and Booth 2008). For example, in his analysis on poverty and democratic 
citizenship in sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton (2008) finds that poverty “is actually positive for several 
important aspects of political participation” (Bratton, 2008: 63).  
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The link between decentralisation and poverty reduction is nonetheless ambiguous. Empirical 
evidences show weak correlations and general scepticism (Crawford, 2008; Crawford and 
Hartmann, 2008; Hiskey and Seligson, 2003; Khan, 2013). In fact, the lack of real commitment by 
the government (Blair, 1997; Crook, 2003), patronage logic within the state, bureaucracy and 
political parties (Vedeld, 2003: 178; Mathew, 1996: 142), elite co-optation and control at local level 
(Blair, 2000: 25; Crook and Manor, 1998) might perpetuate existing poverty condition. Conversely, 
focusing on the power and political dimension of poverty reduction might bring some positive 
results. Manor (1997) finds that the creation of elective local body increases people’ power position. 
In his fieldwork study on Ghana, Crawford (2008: 63), whilst concluding that decentralisation had a 
limited general impact, finds that it helped people to be more aware of their rights, to come together 
and organise themselves. All things considered, as argued by Khan (2013: 165), notwithstanding 
the contradiction between theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, decentralisation and 
poverty reduction have intimately linked each other. 
In this context, the role of civil society cannot be neglected. Civil society is often indicated as an 
autonomous space where non-state actors operate strengthening political participation, democracy 
and development (Fykuyama, 2001, Putnam, 1993; Sklar, 1987). In the African context, civil 
society may perform several functions including the limitation of the power of the state and its 
abuse, promoting civic engagement, monitoring human rights and incorporating marginal groups in 
the political process (Diamond, 1997: 24). Notwithstanding this crucial task, the actual role played 
by civil society in Africa is far from be clear. Some scholars argue that civil society has been 
effective in bringing social and political change (Diamond, 1997; Makumbe, 1998: 307), others 
claim that it barely exists (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Haberson et al., 1994; Hearn, 2001). Senegal 
seems to be closer to this second option: while some restricted social groups – the Muslim 
brotherhood – acquired enough organisational strength and autonomy to bargain and engage 
political relations with the central state (Bayart, 1986: 115; O’Brien, 1989: 187 - 188), the majority 
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of the population are still marginalised and unorganised (O’ Brien, 1986: 83; Patterson, 1998: 439-
441). 
The general argument that brings together poverty reduction, participation and decentralisation has 
been clearly resumed by Blair (2000). Through decentralisation policies, the governments come 
close to the people, which in turn acquire a significant voice in the decision-making process 
(empowerment). Local policies are now the expression of the need of people and results in more 
appropriate interventions, better living and economic condition. “These improvements will then 
reduce poverty and enhance equity among all groups” (Blair, 2000: 23).  
In this analysis, the concept of ‘political space’ relates to the work of Webster and Lars Engberg-
Pedersen (2002) which provides a valuable analytical tool to assess poverty reduction through a 
political approach. Scholars identify three different dimensions: institutional channels; political 
discourses; social and political practices (Webster and Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2002: pp. 8–12). 
These three dimensions try to map a political space: first, the institutional channels help to identify 
the spaces where the poor or the agents on their behalf can exercise their agency. The political 
discourse reflects the engagement of political actors and might inform the policies of the 
government. Finally, the social and political practices look at associational and collective activity 
that might channel and direct the political action of the poor. These dimensions are mutually 
intertwined. In fact, although a government might establish a favourable policy environment and 
provide accessible institutions, this would hardly result in a political space for poverty reduction if 
social and political practices are missing - and thus poor people are marginalised and unorganised - 
or poverty is neglected as a political issue. Conversely, an organised pressure from below or an 
informed discourse may lead a government to introduce innovative institutions. 
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Research design and Case selection 
Senegal as a case study 
The case study method offers several advantages to answer the research question within the 
proposed framework. As argued by Yin (1994: 13) investigators should opt for the case study 
method when contextual conditions are believed to be highly pertinent with the phenomenon of 
study. The aim of this thesis is to assess land and decentralisation policies, not simply at the 
institutional level but also through a closer analysis of the political dynamics that at the local level 
came with their implementation. Particular attention is given to local actors involved and the 
context in which they operate. The way in which the political space is produced, modelled or 
limited by actors at the local level is informed by the context in which is born. Concurrently, 
through the intensive study of a single case, the case study may help to shed light on a larger 
number of cases and a close tie to evidence and data might help the formulation of more precise 
theory (Gerring, 2007: 20; Stake, 2000, Yin, 1981). In this sense, by focusing on Senegal, this study 
might be extended to other African countries, especially in West Africa where other countries have 
recently launched decentralisation reforms (Diep et al. 2016). 
The choice of Senegal as case study is consistent with the chosen design and is a suitable case to 
investigate decentralisation policy and poverty reduction by using the concept of political space for 
three reasons.  
First, the country has also been for long time engaged in land and decentralisation policy. The two-
major land and decentralisation reforms has been enacted around five decades ago in 1964 and 
1972. Such a long period enables to assess and judge the success or failure of decentralisation in 
terms of political participation and poverty reduction.  
Second, there is a strong interconnection between the implementation of land reform and 
decentralisation process (Hesseling, 2009). In fact, several scholars and research highlight the 
 
 
 
12 
 
importance of this relationship as crucial to achieve poverty reduction. (Sen, 1999; Mathew, 1996; 
Vedeld, 2003; Webster, 2000).  
Third, political parties, local organisations and rural elites might be pivotal for the political space 
(Hichey, 2005; Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; Rajasekhar, 2002; Lars Engberg-Pedersen and 
Webster, 2002). Senegal has different potential political actors that might manipulate political 
agency in the name of the poor including political parties and local elites. In particular, the role of 
the traditional religious groups (i.e. Marabouts) is nuanced, and they are simultaneously portrayed 
as feudal lords exploiting rural masses and as main vectors of representation of poor (O’Brien et al. 
2002, Godefroy, 2015). The relations among secular and religious actors, political and social 
dynamics, is a focal point of the political space in the country.  
To conclude, Senegal is a representative case for the political space since it possesses – at least on 
paper – several key elements that might favours its shaping. 
Methods of data analysis  
In this study, decentralisation and land reform are the independent variables and are operationalised 
through the concept of “political space”. The operationalisation is adapted by Webster and Engberg-
Pedersen (2002) and is composed by three dimensions: institutional channels, social and political 
practices and political discourse. thus, I will mainly focus on the first two dimensions to trace the 
evolution of institutions, subaltern actors and their impact on the social and political context, which 
are studied through process tracing methods (Bennett, and Checkel, 2015). 
To start, institutional channels refers to formal spaces where the poor or the agents on their behalf 
can exercise their power, and through which policy formulation can be accessed or contested by 
them, as public hearing and popular assemblies. In order to detect the presence of these channels, 
data are collected through the original text of policies and reforms, NGOs and IOs reports. In 
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Senegal case study, the institutional channels are identified in the rural councils established with the 
land reform in 1964. 
The second dimension refers to social and political practices that influence politics, whose data are 
gathered through NGOs report and secondary literature. The creation of an effective political space 
for poverty reduction cannot only rely on governmental interventions. In fact, “a favourable policy 
environment and committed government may achieve little in poverty reduction if marginalised 
groups are unorganised, […] and if the interests and views of the marginalised remain excluded 
from the process of governance” (Webster and Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2002: 10). This dimension 
mainly looks at the organisational practises, political experience of poor people and others political 
and social groups and the way which they can promote or hamper the participation of poor. 
Specifically, local and religious elites (i.e. Marabout brotherhood) and political parties are identified 
as main actors to investigate this dimension.  
Poverty reduction here is defined in terms of effective participation (Crook, 2003: 78; Vedeld, 
2003: 162); a voice in the decision-making process and influence over public policies and political 
priorities (Khan, 2013: 149), but also the responsiveness and accountability of political actors. In 
this framework key aspects are: rights to vote and rights to participate to local assemblies, actual 
information about the reforms the rights and the powers they confer. For doing so, whenever 
possible, primary data collected in other studies such as interviews to local population, village chief 
and local councillor are used. 
 
Analysis 
Building political spaces: decentralisation and land reforms in post-independent Senegal 
Senegal is a young state that became independent in 1960. As typical for African states, Senegal 
inherited its institutions and state-building process was a particularly sensible as well as complex 
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issue as result of the colonial legacy (Young, 1996). With the access to independence, the 
government of Senegal started a series of reforms to create the new country and take the distance 
from the colonial past. Under the leadership of the socialist president Senghor, Senegal took the 
African way to socialism (Senghor, 1960) with the aim to create a new society, an African 
communitarian society “that privileges the group over the individual and the community of persons 
over their autonomy” (Senghor, 1960: 24).  
With such an ambitious political goal, the political organisation of the national territory, the land 
legislation, the organisation of the rural world epitomised both a crucial element and a particular 
concern. This was the aim of the Law on the National Domain of 1964 and, later on, the political-
administrative reform in 19721. As from the Senegalese Prime minister Mamadou Dia, the 
territorial and land reforms aimed to remove the colonial inequalities and provide the basement for 
the equitable development of the country, through “a technical tool – the bottom-up democratic 
planning, moving from the base to the top – and participative and formative structures (activity 
centres and cooperative societies)” (Dia, 1988: 106. My transl.). The promotion of (political) 
participation, the organisation and the mobilisation of the rural population were essential to create 
“grassroots rural communities, cell of peasant democracy” (Débène and Caverivière, 1988: 187. My 
transl.). In this sense, these reforms start mapping the political space by setting up the institutional 
participative channels. 
In particular, the Law on the National Domain (LND) of 1964 has introduced an innovative 
framework that combines the affirmation of state authority of a newly formed state with the 
willingness to set out inclusive practices at the local level and a fair distribution of resources. The 
text defines as national lands all non-registered land (“all lands not classified as public domain, not 
registered or of which property has not been inscribed in the register of mortgages”, article 1, my 
transl.).  
                                                          
1 The text of law is available on: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/558191435589091130/pdf/Senegal-Law-72-25-on-
the-establishment-of-rural-communities-as-local-authorities.pdf [Accessed: 4 May 2018] 
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Then, the national domain land was divided in four categories: urban zones, classified zones, land 
zone and pioneer zone. Without going into much details, the zones de terroirs (village land zones) 
are those of particular interest, since they are mainly used by rural populations, families for rural 
housing and pastoral activities. The article 8 fixes the principles underlying the distribution and 
allocation of land: free access by membership and productivity (mise en valeur).  
Consequently, the access to land primarily depends on the residence and membership to a rural 
community and on the productive use of the land. The main objective of these principles was not to 
dispossess effective users of the land, rather to abolish any sort of right over the land by people who 
do not till it. Notably, the second aim was to abolish the customary land system based on family 
lineage and bloodline and any payment of rent on the land, which in now property of the state and 
entrusted to (efficient) rural dwellers. (Hesseling, 2009: 250).  
The composition of the rural council also shows the inclusive nature of this reform. In fact, while 
the state retains its right to appoint functionaries and state agents (article 10, point 2), the other 
members of the conseil ruraux are elected among the people effectively resident in the territory and 
primary engaged with rural activities (i.e. rural population) (article 10, point 1); and among 
representatives of agricultural cooperative and collective farms working in the area (article 10, point 
2). Rural councils represent an open institutional channel that can potentially empower and be 
controlled by poor people and their agencies and through which they can take part and be active 
agents in the policy-process. 
Despite the adoption of this reform in 1964, the conseil ruraux have been effectively set up in 1972 
when the first major decentralisation reform was adopted. The law n° 72 – 252, Loi relative aux 
communautés rurales, set up the rural Community (communauté rurale) to organise the 
participation of the population through the action of conseil ruraux.  A communauté rurale is 
composed by “a certain number of villages belonging to the same territory, bound together by 
                                                          
2 The text of the law is available at: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/558191435589091130/pdf/Senegal-Law-72-25-
on-the-establishment-of-rural-communities-as-local-authorities.pdf [Accessed: 4 May 2018]. 
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solidarity […], having common interest and able to provide necessary resources for their 
development. […] Its representative bodies are the rural council and the president of the rural 
councils” (article 1 comma 1 and 2, my transl.).  
Furthermore, this law fixes the formal rules for the establishment and the functioning of the rural 
council. Thus, rural councils are democratic structures, whose members are elected by direct 
universal suffrage for five years (article 4 and article 6; one third of the members are still appointed 
by the State). The conseil rural is now also titled to pursue more general goals including promotion 
of activity and service for the benefit of the community and family support for children education 
(article 26, comma 1 and 2). Concurrently, the central government holds a marked control through 
the sous-préfet (Sub-Prefect). They are directly appointed by the Ministry of the Interior and act as 
guarantor by retaining the right to veto the decision of the rural council (article 55 comma 2) and 
the control over the budget of the rural community (Title V). In this sense, the sous-prefect and by 
extension the central state retains a considerable power over the local community creating a sort of 
‘monitored decentralisation’3 (FAO/FONGS, 1999). 
Another major decentralisation reform has been launched in 1996 with the adoption the Code des 
Collectivités locales (Law n° 96-064) and the law 96-075 on the transfer of competences to regions, 
communes and rural community. The reform introduced and reaffirmed some essential elements at 
the local level. 
The whole members of the rural council are now elected by the rural habitants (article 25 of the 
Code). Currently, the text now specifies that “all sessions of rural council are open to the public” 
and that “all the habitants of the rural community have the right to consult the minute book of 
                                                          
3 The effective exercise of this power is nonetheless unclear. While Freudenberger (1992: xii – xv) and Gellar (1997: 
53) claim that the sous-préfets exercise frequently their authority and have an almost hegemonic control over the rural 
council, Hesseling (2009: 251) argues that “In practice, however, sous-préfets and préfets rarely use these powers, so in 
the majority of cases the rural councils are left free to make decisions and have no fear of correction by higher 
officials”. 
4 The text of the law is available at: https://senegal.eregulations.org/media/code-collec-locales-sen[1].pdf [Accessed: 5 
May 2018]. 
5 The text of the law is available at: [Accessed: 5 May 2018] 
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deliberations” (articles 225, my transl.). The rural community and the rural council are titled with 
new relevant competences in tackling poverty. According to article 33 of the law 96-07 on transfer 
of competences, the rural community is now titled to manage centres for the promotion of social 
rehabilitation; to organise and manage the relief activities and to support the funding of productive 
projects in favour of poor people. 
This brief excursus over land reforms and the subsequent decentralisations reforms provide the 
institutional framework of the political space in Senegal. 
The conseil ruraux are a key institutional channel that can be accessed by rural population and poor. 
Participation is generally open to “persons domiciled in the territory, that are actually residing there, 
that are engaged in rural activities as their main occupation, and enjoying electoral rights” (article 
10, point 1, National Domain Law, 1964. My transl.). Rural population, as citizens, have the rights 
to get involved, to become rural councillors and being active part of the policy process. In this 
regard, another crucial point is the election by direct universal suffrage of the members of the 
council and the five years term which should enhance the accountability of rural councillors. 
Conversely, some boundaries stand out. First, the participation of farmers and villagers formally 
ends with the elections of the councillors. During the sessions, they cannot join the discussion since 
they do not possess any right to speak or vote. Second, through the sous-prèfets, the central 
government is a watchful eye on rural communities. 
To summarise, as from the legal documents, the rural council represents a political body close to 
rural population and rural poor, through which they have access to a certain degree of power in 
terms of rights to vote, eligibility and attendance. Notwithstanding this, while these reforms set up 
an accessible institution for rural population, a closer analysis of the second dimension of political 
space – social and political practices – reveals the presence of constraints and barriers to the active 
role of rural peasants and their participation. 
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Constraints and limitation to the political space in Senegal 
While the first intent of these reforms aimed to enhance the political participation or rural 
population and set up a space in which this same participation (rural council) can actually take 
place, a closer insight reveals that this same space is limited, both on a social and political level. 
This limitation, I argue, is the result of social and political practices that prevented poor people to 
participate. 
The first limitation is related to the existent social practises that essentially circumvent the political 
space. As said, one of the intent of these reforms was to abolish the customary land system based on 
family lineage and bloodline, in order to create the participatory system described above. The 
Explanatory memorandum of the Commission established to draft the land reform is quite clear on 
this point describing the customary framework as a backward “gerontocratic structure in which 
young people have no chance to bloom” (in Golan, 1990: 19 – 20). In the same vein, the article 48 
of the 1972 Law prohibits to head of villages, which usually detained power and prestige in the 
villages, to be elected as president of the rural council. Nevertheless, customary rules are still 
effective and used by local communities so that the land is still handed down through the family 
(IIED, 2017: 2)., with the result the rural poor are still embodied in the traditional relations of 
power.  
Furthermore, rural population, especially in the most remote areas, is not aware of legislation on 
land and decentralisation and have little or no knowledge of the ‘new’ rules, of the rural councils 
but also of the power and the rights they might have in such bodies (Faye, 2008: 8, UNDP, 2001: 
51). In 2008, a chief of a village in the rural community of Sadio said during an interview: “My 
father has founded this village. He has built the well, and the other people joined us, so these lands 
have always belonged to us and they still belong to us. We yield the land to whoever wants to settle 
down” (cited Diallo, 2008. My transl.). While the statement of the village chief cannot be 
generalised to the whole country, it shows how property and power over the land is still firmly in 
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the hand of local lineage families. As a direct consequence, rural population does not rely on rural 
council for the allocation or in case of dispute over the land, instead they still resort to village chiefs 
or other traditional resolution bodies (councils of elders, imams, customary dispute mediation 
groups) (Hesseling, 2009: 261; Schoonmaker Freudenberger, 1992: 67).  
The traditional power of Islamic brotherhoods seemed to be affected neither. On the one hand, the 
land reform did not prevent the Mouride brotherhood to extend their control over the land. A report 
for the World Bank (Schoonmaker Freudenberger, 1990) finds that, the concept of mise en valeur 
introduced by the LND in 1964 has been “used” to spread the peanut’s cultivation and land 
acquisition, at the expenses of other activities carried out by rural population, as local pastoralism 
(Freudenberger and Freudenberger, 1993; Juul, 1993). On the other hand, over the years they have 
developed a patronage rapport with political parties, which enable them to influence the activity of 
the rural councils (Baker, 1973; Markowitz, 1970; Blundo, 1997). For example, in Touba, the holy 
city of Mourdism, rural council are largely influenced by the Mouride brotherhood, to the point that 
politicians of the council are designated by leader of the brotherhood (Beck, 2001: 602). 
Furthermore, the case of a dispute between a wealthy women farmer and a marabout is illuminating. 
Briefly, this dispute is about 140ha that this woman bought from a third party in Ross Béthio and 
that, at one point, started to be claimed by a marabout. The farmer appeals to the rural council, the 
police and the sous-préfet without any result. Then, the sous-préfet decided to put on hold all the 
work over the contested land. Notwithstanding the decision of the sous-préfet the marabout 
restarted working on it, claiming his right to work the land because the case has been closed, 
without any opposition by any of the involved institutions (Kaag et al., 2001: 15). This case shows 
the lack of accountability of the institutions that should empower Senegalese peasants, but also how 
traditional powerful groups can easily ignore the decision taken by formal institutions. 
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In this sense, the political space for poverty reduction in the rural areas of Senegal seems to be 
circumvented, but it is also restricted. On the one hand, instead of access the institutional channels, 
rural population and rural poor walk around it and opt for the same traditional framework that the 
reforms were supposed to abolish; on the other hand, the space is restricted because of the 
traditional relations of power that the reforms have failed to rebalance. Therefore, traditional 
relations of power are not only intact but, as argued by Foucault and Lefebvre, they also entered and 
reproduced themselves in the institutional space, with the result of limiting the participation of rural 
population.  
The second limitation is related to the political practises and the highly political nature of rural 
councils. that prevent the political space to emerge. While this trait should favour the shaping of a 
political space, since it indicates that the institutional channels accessed by the poor are actually part 
of the political process concerning them, the political and power dynamics within the councils 
constrains the political space. In particular, the overwhelming power of presidents Senghor’s party, 
the Socialist Party (PS) had largely influenced the activity of the rural council in the allocation of 
lands. Ultimately, the work of the rural council in the allocation or the settlement of disputes over 
the land was not oriented to empower rural dwellers according to the principles of mise en valeur, 
rather it is driven by the party’s interest. In this regard, a member of the opposition Party – 
Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) – in front tribunal of Ziguinchor in Casamance shortly after the 
election of the rural council in 1978, argues that the council settled a dispute “by relying on political 
basis in order to entrust the land to X since he is a member of the PS too. This is made to our 
detriment, as members of the PDS” (cited in Hesseling, 1994: 254, my transl.)”. 
In addition to the political struggle among different political parties, internal fighting within the 
same political party distort the collegial management of the land. This phenomenon has been 
described as “political factionalism” and it has especially characterised the PS, divided in faction A 
and faction B (Baker, 1973; Blundo, 1995; Diop, 2006; Foltz, 1969: 152; Hesseling, 1994; Kaag, 
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2001; Kaag et al. 2001; Venema, 1996). A faction develops from a clan, which Foltz (1969:152) 
has defined as “the extension of the patron-client relationship into the political arena, […] a group 
of people united behind a single leader (or leading family) who expect to profit indirectly from any 
political success the leader may achieve”.  
The faction develops at the different political level (national, regional, local), linking the centre with 
the local, the elite with the mass, through a dense network of personal relationship and patronage 
around the single political leader. Thus, politics at the local level is largely influenced by patronage 
dynamics and the internal fights among these factions. For example, candidates for rural councillor 
are selected by the party also according to his reputation in the community (Vemena, 1996: 7). Not 
surprisingly, people sitting in the councils are generally local notables or eminent public figures 
(Kaag, 2001: 121) who enjoy a high reputation within the community, that can extend the patronage 
network, and on which the party relies to assure the of control on rural masses.  As argued by Diop 
(2006: 151) “the central power count on historical [social] categories favoured at the local level to 
passing out its authority. Through this mediation, local power guarantees the authority of central 
power at the local level, which in turn is content with the status quo”. Furthermore, the political 
factionalism and rivalry hampered the proper functioning of the rural council. This may occur at the 
operational level – inefficacy of council’s meeting - through obstructionism or absenteeism of the 
members of the opposition faction, or at managerial level by leading to a misuse of council funds 
(Blundo 1998). Finally, the political division might also deepen rivalry among rural population and 
families who belong to a faction or the other (Kaag, 2001: 164, 171).  
The fact that parties’ and factions’ interests have a substantial influence in the work of the rural 
council is only reinforcing a widespread sentiment of mistrust toward the state, that exacerbate the 
distance between locals and political space. All these actors are generally seen by rural peasants as 
strangers or exploiters. The secretary of a religious organisation (daira) looking for funding to start 
an income-generating activity stated: “The council is only interested in politics. That is the reason I 
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don't want to have anything to do with the council” (cited in Venema, 1996: 8). Not surprisingly, far 
from being a space that can be controlled or contested, rural population or popular agencies 
consider rural councils as instruments held and controlled by the state or by the ruling party. 
(Gellar, 1997: 54). This state of play is also strengthened by cultural and social behaviour about the 
active involvement in public event. According to the village chief of Saly Escale, the lack of 
participation to the sessions of the council or the consultation of the ledger of the deliberations is 
explained by the fact that it is not polite to attend events without an invitation: “if you go to a 
baptism without an invitation, wherever you broke, even a wooden spoon, you must pay” (cited in 
Blundo, 1998: 7).  
 
Social and political practices refer to the organisational and political experience of social groups. As 
shown in the previous paragraphs, the practises do not result in an organisation or mobilisation or 
rural peasants, farmers, who are indeed largely unorganised and scattered (Fatton, 1988: 253; 
Patterson, 1998: 426). Rather in a re-organisation and a reproduction traditional dominant social 
group groups, which reaffirmed their power within the new institutions (Markowitz, 1970).  
To conclude, the words of a rural Senegalese man state the general failure of these policies in 
addressing poverty: “Senegal is a difficult country to live in now. There are many more poor people 
than rich people. But the rich people are the ones with power. Poor people must do what rich people 
want in order to gain anything” (cited in Patterson, 1998: 426). 
 
Conclusion 
As stated by Hickey and Mohan: “it would be misleading to see all participatory spaces, provided or 
claimed, as disempowering simply because they are touched by the ‘development machine’” 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 13).  
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The aim of this thesis was to assess decentralisation policy and land reform in Senegal and their 
influence on poverty reduction. Resorting to the analytical concept of political space for poverty 
reduction, I analysed the impact of Senegalese land reform of 1964 and the decentralisation policies 
of 1972 and 1996. This study illustrates the existence of a political space for poverty reduction but, 
nevertheless, of a restricted one. Findings are consistent with scholars who move away from a 
purely institutional approach and claim the need for a more accurate investigation of political and 
power relations existing around and within these institutions.  
Therefore, although these reforms set up rural councils, democratic institutional channels oriented 
to enhance the political participation and empower rural population, both political and social 
practices are limited. More precisely, they are embedded in their traditional dynamics and relations 
of power that keep obstructing effective participation. Finally, this did not foster the political power 
of rural population and poor people.  
Firstly, the analysis highlights that the persistence and the re-production of traditional social 
practices has an important role in foreclosing the emergence of a political space. This result is also 
amplified by a general lack of knowledge and information about the reforms. First, the traditional 
local landowners still retain the power over the land, treating it as their own property (despite a 
formal abolishment of property rights with the Law on National Domain). Second, peasants and 
farmers continue to address local landowners or village chiefs for everything relating to land 
allocation and use and disputes settlements, instead of making their voice be heard inside the rural 
council. Moreover, similar considerations can be made concerning the member of the religious 
elites. The Marabout brotherhood has continued to make business as usual and they have actually 
extended their control on land cultivation. At the same time, their power is used to influence the 
activity of the rural council with little chance for local farmers.  
Secondly, the analysis finds out that also political practices do not promote the development of a 
political space. In rural councils, the internal dynamics, the decision-making process and the 
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verdicts are largely influenced and manipulated by the political parties. This occurs both in political 
clashes among the parties and in internal rivalry among different factions within the same party. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of factionalism spreads a patronage’s dynamics which contributes to 
obstruct participation and political mobilisation of rural farmers. Finally, peasants and poor people 
generally mistrust politicians and, in turn, the spaces in which they operate, avoiding them.  
The final assessment can demoralise. At the same time, if limitations such the one presented in this 
and other studies would be properly taken into account, it is desirable that the next reforms would 
not be the umpteenth exercise of institutional design, but an actual effort to empower rural farmers 
and poor to reduce poverty in the country. 
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non libertaire, Paris: Selio, In L. Greffier, 2014. Animation, vie associative, des acteurs s'engagent, 
Carrières Sociales Editions. 
 
 
 
28 
 
Diallo, F. 2008. Etudes de Cas des Communautés Rurales de Yène et de Sadio. Saint Louis: 
Universite´ Gaston Berger. 
Diamond, L., 1997. Prospects for Democratic Development in Africa, Essays in Public Policy 
No.74 28–36. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.  
Diep, L., D. Archer, and C. Gueye, 2016. Decentralisation in West Africa: the implications for 
urban climate change governance. Working Paper February 2016. 
Diop D., 2006, Décentralisation et gouvernance locale au Sénégal : Quelle pertinence pour le 
développement local ? Paris, L’Harmattan. 
Dixon, P.J. and Macarov, J., 1998. Poverty: A Persistent Global Reality, London: Routledge. 
Dollar, D., and Kraay, A., 2002. Growth is good for the poor, Journal of Economic Growth, 7: 195 
– 225. 
Dollar, D., Kleineberg, T., Kraay, A., 2016. Growth still is good for the poor, European Economic 
Review, 81 (2016), 68–85. 
FAO/FONGS, 1999. Renforcement des capacités techniques et d’analyse des organisations 
paysannes. Formation en matière de politique agricoles. Volume 1 : La décentralisation au 
Sénégal. Available at: https://www.mpl.ird.fr/crea/taller-
colombia/FAO/SDAR/TYPOLOGY%20OF%20DECENTRALIZATION%20PROCESSES/CD%2
0typology/docs/D19_1F.pdf [Accessed on: 24 May 2018] 
Fatton, R., 1988. Bringing the Ruling Class Back in: Class, State, and Hegemony in 
Africa. Comparative Politics, 20(3), pp.253–264. 
Foltz, W.J., 1969. Social Structure and Political Behavior of Senegalese Elites. Cross-Cultural 
Research, 4(2), pp.145–163. 
 
 
 
29 
 
Fosu, A. K., 2017. Growth, inequality, and poverty reduction in developing countries: Recent 
global evidence, Research in Economics, 71: 306–336. 
Foucault, M., 1975. Surveiller et punir : naissance de la prison, Paris: Gallimard. 
Foucault, M., 1978. The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1 : An introduction. New York: Pantheon Books.   
Foucault, M., 1982. The Subject and Power, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No 4, pp. 777 – 795.  
Freudenberger, K. S and Freudenberger, M., 1993. Pastoralism in Peril: Pressures on Grazing 
Land in Senegal. DRYLANDS PROSGRAMME: Pastoral Land Tenure Series, No. 4, pp. 1 – 38. 
Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/7351IIED.pdf [Accessed on: 11 May 2018]. 
Friedman, J., 1992, Empowerment. The Politics of Alternative Development, Cambridge, MA, 
Blackwell. 
Gaventa, J., 2006. Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis. IDS Bulletin, Volume 37, 
Number 6, pp. 23 – 33.  
Gaventa, J., and Barret, G., 2012. Mapping the Outcomes of Citizen Engagement. World 
Development Vol. 40, No. 12, pp. 2399–2410. 
Gellar, S., 1997. Conseils ruraux et gestion décentralisée des ressources naturelles au Sénégal: le 
défi Comment transformer ces concepts en réalité, in Tersiguel, P. & Becker, C., 1997. 
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